It is estimated that this AI desktop will become popular very soon

Yushi Technology, from 444.9 billion to 192.9 billion: a valuation massacre 477 yuan. This was Yushi Technology's closing price on September 11, with its market value officially falling below 200 billion. Looking back 18 trading days, this "first humanoid robot stock" touched 1100 yuan during the STAR Market's call auction phase, corresponding to a market value of 444.9 billion. In 18 days, it evaporated over 240 billion, more than halving. Emotional premium comes fast and goes faster Yushi Technology's issue price was 150.8 yuan, with an issue P/E ratio of 219 times, while the average P/E ratio of the general equipment manufacturing industry it belongs to is only 38 times. On the first day of listing, it opened directly at 1100 yuan, which means an emotional premium of 629% was added on top of the issue price. Then what? Big drops, small drops, slow declines, and then big drops again—a textbook "emotional tide retreat." It hardly gave short-term traders a decent escape window. Growth cliff, profits even more painful In the first half of 2026, revenue was 1.152 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 48.54%, which is indeed impressive in traditional manufacturing. But don't forget, its revenue growth in 2025 was 332%. From 332% to 48%, this cliff is too steep. The profit side is even more awkward—net profit attributable to the parent company was 274 million yuan in the first half, indeed turning profitable, but net profit excluding non-recurring items dropped 19.34% year-on-year. The company said this was due to a sharp increase in R&D and sales expenses, which makes sense, but it also reveals a reality: the gap from humanoid robots "being able to run and jump" to "being able to make money" is a commercialization chasm filled with real money. What's worse, even after falling to 477 yuan, the TTM P/E ratio is still above 330 times. Institutional divergence is absurdly large Nomura's target price is 370 yuan, CCB International only 269 yuan, and CITIC is even harsher, with a reasonable stock price range of 130 to 145 yuan. The price range among these three institutions exceeds 200%. The core disagreement boils down to one sentence: Is Yushi a "hardware manufacturing company" or an "AI platform enterprise"? Pricing it as the former means a P/E ratio at most twice the industry average; pricing it as the latter means high valuation during loss periods is tolerable, but the premise is that growth must be continuously validated. When growth falls from 332% to 48%, the market naturally leans toward the former. Small free float becomes an "accelerator" At the beginning of Yushi's listing, the freely tradable shares were very few, with a large number of pre-IPO shares and strategic placement shares locked up, and the earliest large-scale unlocking not until August 2027. Such a tiny free float amplifies both upward and downward moves. On September 11, the turnover rate reached 85.28%—almost all tradable chips turned over in one day. It's not just Yushi's problem; the entire sector is clearing out From early 2026 to early September, the humanoid robot sector index fell 13%, underperforming the Shanghai Composite Index by 12 percentage points. The sector's PE percentile has dropped to 0% in nearly a year, reaching the "cheap" range. But between cheap and worth buying, there is still a key variable: the timeline for performance fulfillment. BOCOM International put it well: the industry's valuation logic is shifting from "technology Beta" to "delivery Alpha." You show technological breakthroughs, but the market no longer pays; you have to present quantifiable orders and replicable delivery capabilities. Yushi's fully autonomous combat technology released on September 7 is indeed impressive, but the stock price still fell the next day. Policy direction is also changing The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology signals a focus on core components and embodied intelligence, promoting robot applications in agriculture, medical care, and elderly care. The National Development and Reform Commission clearly states: prevent blind follow-ups and herd behavior. Translation: industrial support is shifting from "encouraging entry" to "selecting winners." For leading companies like Yushi, this is actually good news—the competitors relying on concept hype will accelerate clearing out. 477 is not the end, but a midpoint Yushi's CEO himself admits that robots doing simple assembly in their own factory still lag in speed and efficiency. This is honest, but it also means: the "humanoid robot general platform" valued at 444.9 billion yuan by the market is still in the early stage of validation. The window for concept premium is closing, and the window for performance fulfillment is opening. This transition will not be gentle.

#AI发展焦虑升温，芯片股集体走弱 Unitree Robotics, from 444.9 billion down to 192.9 billion: a valuation massacre 477 yuan. This was Unitree Robotics' closing price on September 11, with its market value officially falling below 200 billion. Counting back 18 trading days, this "first humanoid robot stock" touched 1100 yuan during the STAR Market's call auction phase, corresponding to a market value of 444.9 billion. In 18 days, it evaporated over 240 billion, more than halving. Emotional premium comes fast and goes even faster Unitree Robotics' issue price was 150.8 yuan, with an issue P/E ratio of 219 times, while the average P/E ratio of the general equipment manufacturing industry it belongs to was only 38 times. On the first day of listing, the opening price directly surged to 1100 yuan, which means an emotional premium of 629% was added on top of the issue price. Then what? Big drops, small drops, slow declines, and then big drops again—a textbook "emotional retreat." It hardly gave short-term traders a decent escape window. Growth cliff, profits even more painful In the first half of 2026, revenue was 1.152 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 48.54%, which is indeed impressive in traditional manufacturing. But don't forget, its revenue growth rate in 2025 was 332%. From 332% down to 48%, this cliff is too steep. $UNITREE

The bear market is long and arduous, the landlord's family has no surplus grain left, can't hold on anymore, and Balancer also doesn't plan to continue playing; the final liquidation plan will be completed by the end of July 2028.

You put too much sauce on the steamed bun

Pop Mart has recently become unusually quiet, unlike itself. After the mid-year report, the stock price once dropped to around HKD 140, then quickly pulled back above 150. Since the end of August, the stock price has been hovering around 155, with trading volume shrinking to just a few hundred million per day. For a growth stock with a market cap of about 200 billion and a history of dramatic ups and downs, this situation is indeed somewhat abnormal. Duan Yongping is clearly a key variable. He is already a major shareholder and has established a huge options position. He’s not simply buying and holding; he’s executing a full strategy—selling puts to acquire shares, selling covered calls on the upside, and earning time value (Theta) during sideways movement. There are large buy orders supporting the downside and options supply capping the upside. Pop Mart’s stock price seems to be equipped with shock absorbers, with volatility artificially smoothed out. Why now, of all times? 2026 is inherently a year of adjustment for Pop Mart—not that growth stops, but the explosive growth in 2025 is already well known. The market is now waiting to see: how much can it grow in a normal year? Until the next decent earnings report comes out, neither bulls nor bears have new pricing reasons. Moreover, with highly concentrated shareholding—Wang Ning holding a large stake, Duan Yongping’s equity close to 100 million shares—the actual freely traded shares involved in daily pricing are far fewer than the total shares outstanding. Even more striking, the number of shares corresponding to his single batch of options exceeds Pop Mart’s recent daily spot trading volume. Such a massive capital inflow into a stock with an increasingly small active float inevitably changes its microstructure. Who benefits the most? The sellers of volatility. Assuming the stock price stays stuck at 155. An ordinary shareholder’s return for the month is roughly zero; Duan Yongping, however, may have already collected a round of premiums from puts and calls. When the price falls, he buys shares; when it rises, he sells calls; if it stays flat, he’s even happier—each day that passes, he pockets part of the premium. During the same sideways period, different people earn completely different things. Who suffers the most? Those buying options to bet on direction, and those who can only buy the underlying stock and wait foolishly. The latter’s loss is not on paper but opportunity cost. Don’t interpret this as “ordinary retail investors’ money being taken by Duan Yongping.” Premiums come from option buyers—put buyers pay for insurance, call buyers pay for upside potential. Duan Yongping is simply selling uncertainty to them. If the actual volatility later is less than the implied volatility priced into options, money flows from volatility buyers to sellers. As for pure stock investors, their money isn’t lost, but after half a year still stuck at 155, other assets may have risen 20%. This is also a cost, more hidden than a loss. Can this situation last? It can last for a while, but not forever. Duan Yongping’s large-scale options and market maker delta hedging can indeed suppress short-term volatility—someone buys when it falls, someone sells when it rises, keeping the price pressed within a range. But the biggest constraint isn’t whether he has enough money, it’s fundamentals. Real big moves will wait for the next earnings report to let the market reprice. If it keeps sideways like this, the market will adjust itself. Short-term funds will be the first to leave; no volatility means no trading value, so volume will worsen. Then more people will find selling options profitable and join in selling volatility, causing more sellers and thinner premiums, making the business less attractive again. Some stock holders will think: since there’s no catalyst in the short term, why should I stay here? Capital will start flowing to other opportunities. This creates a cycle: low volatility → low volume → bigger capital influence → even lower volatility, until broken by new information. Similar things have happened historically. JPMorgan’s collar strategy in the US is a typical example—large funds holding big put and call positions on the S&P 500, with Wall Street traders closely watching their strike prices. Near expiration, market makers’ hedging clearly affects price paths. Such “option walls” usually end in one of two ways: rolling positions at expiration or being broken by a major market move. It can’t be said Duan Yongping is subjectively trying to control the market, but objectively: in a window of shrinking volume, concentrated shares, and lack of new information, his huge position and options strategy have indeed become an important variable in Pop Mart’s short-term price formation. Ultimately, the real issue is opportunity cost. Duan Yongping is bullish on Pop Mart long-term; he buys on dips, sells some upside, and earns premiums sideways—all perfectly rational from his perspective. But with different capital structures, the cost of waiting differs. He can turn waiting itself into a cash-flow business with massive cash, while ordinary stockholders can only wait—over the same half year, he collects rent, you bear opportunity cost. So the real test for Pop Mart is no longer “is it expensive?” but “when will it realize value?” If a stock is clearly not expensive but can’t find reasons to reprice in the coming months, the biggest risk isn’t losing money but slowly losing time and opportunity cost. What if more and more stockholders realize this and choose to exit first? Phase one: shares loosen up, volume actually expands—previously a few hundred million a day because no one wanted to move, now long-term holders actively supply shares, shifting the supply curve right, and the 155 price anchor starts to wobble. Phase two: Duan Yongping and other value investors step in. If they still believe 150, 145, or even lower are clearly below intrinsic value, they welcome these shares. Essentially, shares transfer from those who “can’t wait” to those who “can wait”—not from wrong to right, but from impatient to patient. When the day comes that profits again exceed expectations and new fundamental signals appear, interesting things happen. Because then very few shares are willing to sell, even a small buy order can trigger a huge price jump. This is the other side of highly concentrated shares—usually like dead water, but once repriced, it can surge dramatically. The hardest thing about long-term investing is this: you’re right about the company, valuation, and long-term judgment, but due to different time horizons, you get pushed out by opportunity cost on the eve of a rise. This isn’t necessarily a wrong sale; opportunity cost is a real cost. Everyone may agree on the company, but with different capital structures, the “price” of waiting is completely different. It’s not “patience beats impatience,” but patient capital has already turned waiting itself into a tradable, rent-collecting asset. So in the end, who wins and who loses? The market never cares about right or wrong, only who has the capital to wait.

Moore Threads lost 50 billion yuan in one day, domestic GPUs collectively "silent" "The first domestic GPU stock" Moore Threads () encountered its first limit-down after listing. On September 7, Moore Threads opened about 4% lower, then its stock price plunged to the limit-down, closing at 415.49 yuan/share, hitting a new low since listing. The company's market value also dropped to 195.3 billion yuan, falling below the 200 billion yuan mark, with nearly 50 billion yuan evaporated in one day. The unlocking of restricted shares was the trigger for Moore Threads' stock price decline. In December last year, Moore Threads was listed on the STAR Market. At that time, the company publicly issued 70 million shares, among which 25.7745 million offline restricted shares were unlocked and became tradable on September 7. This accounts for 5.48% of the company's total share capital and 85% of the current circulating shares. Based on the latest stock price, the market value of the unlocked shares today is about 1.071 billion yuan. The shareholders whose shares were just unlocked also have enough motivation to reduce holdings. These unlocked shares were purchased at an issue price of 114.28 yuan. Even if sold at the limit-down price of 415.49 yuan, they can still achieve about 2.6 times the return. Regarding the limit-down situation, Moore Threads staff responded that today is the large-scale unlocking day of offline placement restricted shares, and investors should view it rationally. The company's fundamentals are normal. Besides the unlocking of restricted shares, another domestic GPU leader, Suiruan Technology ( On September 7, Suiruan Technology announced its issuance results. The company plans to issue 43.0352 million shares at an issue price of 142.18 yuan/share and is expected to be listed soon on the STAR Market. With Suiruan Technology entering the STAR Market, the scarcity of Moore Threads as an A-share GPU target will be greatly diluted. In terms of market value, after issuance, Suiruan Technology's total market value is about 61.187 billion yuan, less than one-third of Moore Threads' current market value. It is worth noting that this unlocking is only for Moore Threads' offline restricted shares. As the lock-up period of pre-listing shareholders expires, the company will face a larger wave of unlocking. Moore Threads' fourth largest shareholder Shenzhen Minghao and fifth largest shareholder Guosheng Capital, among other institutional shareholders, will have their shares unlocked in December this year. According to iFind data from Tonghuashun, the scale of restricted shares unlocked in December will reach 186 million shares, about 39.55% of the total share capital. Based on the latest stock price, the market value of these 186 million restricted shares is about 77.242 billion yuan. In December 2028 and December 2029, Moore Threads will also have 73.81 million and 145 million restricted shares unlocked respectively. After Moore Threads, Muxi Co., Ltd. ( With Moore Threads hitting the limit-down in one day, the company's latest stock price has halved compared to the high point after listing last year. In December last year, the company's stock price reached a high of 941.08 yuan/share. Compared to that peak, the latest stock price has dropped about 56%, and the total market value has lost nearly 250 billion yuan. As the actual controller of Moore Threads, Zhang Jianzhong's net worth has also shrunk. Currently, Zhang Jianzhong directly holds 9.41% of the listed company’s shares and indirectly holds 1.42% through holding platforms Nanjing Shen'ao and employee holding platforms Hangzhou Hua'ao, Hangzhou Zhong'ao, and Hangzhou Jing'ao, totaling 10.83%. Based on the latest stock price, his shareholding market value is about 21 billion yuan. Domestic GPUs collectively decline On the same day Moore Threads hit the limit-down, multiple domestic GPU companies in A-shares and Hong Kong stocks also saw their stock prices fall simultaneously. Muxi Co., Ltd.'s stock price dropped 9.67% to 570.08 yuan/share, Tiancai Zhixin ( These four domestic GPU companies were all listed on A-shares or Hong Kong stocks between December last year and January this year, benefiting from the semiconductor sector's upward momentum from March to June this year. In June, Tiancai Zhixin and Biren Technology's stock prices hit their highest since listing; in July, Muxi Co., Ltd. hit a new high after listing; Moore Threads also reached its intra-year high. However, since then, the stock prices of these companies have generally declined, falling more than 40% in about two months, with Tiancai Zhixin's stock price dropping 60%. The decline in domestic GPU company stock prices is influenced not only by the unlocking of restricted shares and increased circulating chips but also by the industry's entry into an overheated correction cycle. In July this year, Michael Wilson, Morgan Stanley's chief US stock strategist, sent a clear signal to the market. He believed the time for sector rotation had come, advising investors to reduce semiconductor holdings and shift to hyperscale cloud computing providers. Since July, the global AI computing power industry chain has undergone a deep correction. From the perspective of domestic GPU companies themselves, although several companies achieved rapid revenue growth in the first half of the year, their revenue scale remains low, and none have achieved profitability in their main business, making it difficult to sustain high market value long-term. From the price-to-sales ratio perspective, on July 1 this year, the global computing power leader Nvidia's PS (TTM) was 18.86, while Moore Threads, Muxi Co., Ltd., Tiancai Zhixin, and Biren Technology were 125, 152, 103, and 59 respectively; valuation levels far exceeded the industry leader. With the stock price correction of these four companies, their PS ratios have also declined, closing at 77, 111, 48, and 42 respectively on September 7. Regarding profitability, in the first half of this year, Moore Threads and Biren Technology narrowed their net losses attributable to the parent company but have not yet turned profitable. Muxi Co., Ltd. and Tiancai Zhixin achieved net profits attributable to the parent company of 612 million yuan and 106 million yuan respectively, but their profitability mainly came from unrealized gains on financial assets. Among them, Muxi Co., Ltd. recorded 887 million yuan in fair value gains on trading financial assets in the first half of the year, which the company stated "is not sustainable." Excluding this impact, Muxi Co., Ltd. had a net loss of 49 million yuan attributable to the parent company after deducting non-recurring gains and losses. Tiancai Zhixin's turnaround also came from unrealized gains on financial assets, recording 756 million yuan in fair value gains through its stake in Shenghe Jingwei. Excluding this gain, the company's net profit attributable to the parent company would also turn negative. Moore Threads accelerates commercialization As the first of the "Four Little Dragons" of domestic GPUs listed in the capital market, Moore Threads was founded in 2020 by Zhang Jianzhong, former global vice president and Greater China general manager of Nvidia. Currently, Moore Threads is one of the few domestic manufacturers capable of full-function GPU mass production and sales, having established a complete chip product matrix covering cloud, edge, and terminal. In the first half of this year, Moore Threads achieved operating revenue of 1.736 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 147.42%, exceeding the full-year revenue scale of 2025; net loss attributable to the parent company was 12 million yuan, narrowing by 95.73% year-on-year; net loss attributable to the parent company after deducting non-recurring gains and losses was 151 million yuan, narrowing by 52.37% year-on-year. Behind Moore Threads' revenue growth is an accelerating commercialization process. In 2024, Moore Threads released its fourth-generation GPU architecture "Pinghu." Its representative product, the MTT S5000, supports full-precision computing from FP8 to FP64 and is Moore Threads' flagship product. Based on the S5000, Moore Threads built the Ku'a (KUAE) ten-thousand-card intelligent computing cluster, providing computing power support for training and inference of ultra-large-scale models. Moore Threads recently revealed application cases of the intelligent computing cluster in a conference call. The company cooperated with Beijing Zhiyuan Artificial Intelligence Research Institute to complete the full-process training of Zhiyuan's self-developed embodied brain model RoboBrain2.5 using the MTT S5000 cluster. The Peking University EvoPhys team trained the 5D world model EvoPhys-World on the MTT S5000 full-function GPU. Additionally, the company has "released and adapted" the latest models DeepSeek-V4, MiniMax H3, Kimi-K3, and Zhipu GLM-5.3-Flash on the MTT S5000. Regarding customers, Moore Threads stated that in the first half of this year, it has already onboarded key clients in leading internet companies and telecom operators. While advancing commercialization, Moore Threads is actively developing next-generation GPU products. The company previously released the fifth-generation GPU architecture "Huagang," which supports full-precision computing with significantly improved computing density and efficiency. Based on this architecture, Moore Threads will launch the high-performance AI training and inference chip "Huashan" and the chip "Lushan" specialized in high-performance graphics rendering. The company stated that GPU products related to Lushan are expected to be launched within the year.

Doubao, how do you explain the strawberry 🍓 on your neck?

Let's first talk about the Russell matter, because it better illustrates the changing position of Tron Inc. (Nasdaq: TRON) in the U.S. capital markets than simply looking at how much a single institution has bought. The company’s inclusion in the Russell 2000, Russell 2500, and Russell 3000 indexes means it has entered three layers of coverage within the mainstream U.S. index system: the Russell 3000 covers the broad market, the Russell 2500 fills the mid-small cap intersection, and the Russell 2000 directly targets the small-cap capital pool. For a publicly listed company executing a TRX treasury strategy, entering these indexes is not just a nameplate; it will drive index funds, quantitative products, pension, and allocation accounts to follow or build positions according to the rules, resulting in more stable trading depth and secondary market exposure. Returning to institutional holdings, public information already reveals the presence of traditional financial institutions. According to Nasdaq’s institutional holdings page and related 13F filings, BlackRock, Vanguard funds, and Goldman Sachs-managed funds all appear on Tron Inc.’s institutional ownership list. This combination is quite representative: BlackRock focuses on broad market allocation and ETF flows, Vanguard funds mainly hold indexes long-term, and Goldman Sachs-managed funds cover asset management, investment banking, and strategic portfolios. The simultaneous presence of these three in the holdings indicates that TRON-related listed companies are no longer only attracting crypto-native capital; traditional asset management is also beginning to engage through stock accounts. Institutional data mainly comes from 13F regulatory filings, which should be clarified: 13F is disclosed quarterly, with a time lag after submission, so what you see on the page may not reflect real-time positions after today’s close; the latest public documents should be the reference. Even with the lag, the trend is clear—more and more institutions are adding Tron Inc. to their investable lists. The underlying logic is not just hype; it’s that the company’s execution of TRX as a treasury asset is steadily materializing. The TRX treasury strategy is the core of the entire line. Tron Inc. is listed on Nasdaq as a U.S. stock company, but its balance sheet treats TRX as one of the main treasury assets being continuously accumulated; according to company disclosures, the portion of cash and equivalents exceeding operational needs, combined with TRX, forms the treasury reserve. TRX is a regularly held major asset and is dynamically adjusted based on market conditions and business cash requirements. More importantly, the company plans to keep accumulating TRX and use TRON ecosystem DeFi channels like JustLend for liquid staking, with staking yields feeding back into treasury income. This structure directly links the listed company’s finances with the TRON on-chain economy: on-chain transaction volume, stablecoin circulation, and staking participation increases will translate into company asset quality; the company’s continuous buying and holding of TRX reduces circulating sell pressure and enhances market recognition of TRX’s strategic use. From an ecosystem perspective, Tron Inc. acts as a transit point for TRON’s entry into traditional capital. Previously, institutions wanting exposure to TRX had to go through exchanges, wallets, custody, and compliance reviews; now, through Nasdaq stock, Russell indexes, and 13F holdings disclosures, institutions can engage with the TRON narrative using familiar U.S. equity research, risk control, and compliance processes. The presence of BlackRock, Vanguard funds, and Goldman Sachs-managed funds in holdings, combined with inclusion in the three Russell indexes, creates a three-layer connection: "stock side investable, index side trackable, on-chain side treasury and staking." The closer this connection, the lower the recognition cost of the TRON ecosystem among U.S. institutions, making subsequent incremental allocations smoother. Regarding upside potential, no need to shout multiples—just look at three tangible variables. First, passive and semi-active inflows after index inclusion: coverage by Russell 2000, 2500, and 3000 means small and mid-cap strategy products of different scopes can include it in their watchlists. Second, institutional holdings going from zero to including BlackRock, Vanguard, and Goldman Sachs-managed funds; this demonstration effect will drive more mutual funds, ETFs, and family offices to conduct secondary research. Third, the continuous expansion of the TRX treasury: the company’s buying, holding, and staking creates a crypto asset exposure on the balance sheet; TRX demand is not only on the retail trading side but also from the listed company’s treasury as a long-term buyer. Overall, this wave for Tron Inc. is an upgrade from "crypto project backdoor listing" to "U.S. stock indexes + institutional holdings + TRX treasury" three-pronged parallel development. Traditional financial institutions’ attention and the TRON ecosystem’s capitalization path are accelerating. Subsequent institutional allocations, index rebalancing, and TRX reserve expansion combined will positively catalyze both the stock price and TRX ecosystem valuation. For those wanting to check data on the listed company, Nasdaq’s institutional holdings page directly shows institution names, shareholdings, and recent trading changes: Cross-check with 13F regulatory filings. @justinsuntron @trondao #TRONEcoStar @trondaoCN @anchor9960