EricSJ

推特@sjbtc9丨内容输出：美股相关、二级市场技术分析、Web3项目观点

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Nearly $400 billion left by Buffett has started to be spent #伯克希尔结束净卖出，重启大额配置 What is this telling the market? This might be the most important Berkshire Hathaway financial report to seriously look at in the past three years $BRKB Because this data shows Berkshire has become a net buyer of stocks again, ending the previous 14 consecutive quarters of net stock selling In recent years, Berkshire has been selling in various ways without repurchasing Meanwhile, cash kept piling up, eventually reaching nearly $400 billion The latest report shows that in Q2, Berkshire bought about $23.5 billion in stocks and sold about $3.7 billion, with a net stock purchase of nearly $19.8 billion in a single quarter What I find most worth mentioning is the buyback action ➠ In the first half of the year, Berkshire repurchased about $4.8 billion of its own stock, with the vast majority occurring in Q2 ($4.5 billion) Here, some background is needed Starting in 2026, Greg Abel will officially take over as Berkshire CEO, while Buffett will continue as chairman; Berkshire's current buyback policy has clearly placed capital allocation decisions in the CEO's hands, requiring consultation with the chairman In other words, after consultation, they will only execute buybacks if the buyback price is below a conservatively estimated intrinsic value So at least one message from Q2 is that Berkshire's top management believes the price is undervalued and worth buying The interesting part is that Berkshire itself is a huge asset portfolio Buying back Berkshire stock is essentially no different in nature from buying Apple or related portfolio holdings Because Berkshire is not a single-business company but a basket of capital allocation composed of insurance float, operating businesses, and stock investments This is more direct than any interview statement like "I am confident about the upcoming market" _____________________________________ However, Q2 net stock purchases only account for about 5% of the broad cash at the end of the period So it is still too early to conclude that the bearish trend is over based on just this quarter We can only say that in recent years, this cash has been more like a card placed on the table Berkshire chose not to play the card, but in Q2, part of this card was finally played But the card is far from fully played At least playing the card is a good sign; we can observe more, and I won’t elaborate on more financial data Just throwing out this one viewpoint

A little-known fact: Pump fun's DEX is also the largest DEX on Solana This means that the Pump Fun protocol is both the largest Launchpad and the largest DEX on Solana, occupying the leading position in two tracks with one project Currently, this situation does not exist on the mainstream chains in the market Moreover, the largest source of fees for Pump fun actually comes from PumpSwap, not the LaunchPad part of the business In the chart in Figure 2, you can actually divide them into three parts to look at its main revenue structure This is the chart data I have organized; if you look at the original Defillama data, it would be even more chaotic: (1) Bonding Curve fee scale = 62.06 million + 10.86 million + 5.22 million, totaling about 78.14 million USD This is the main business for which Pump fun is known in the market, responsible for the token lifecycle's launch phase From the protocol capture perspective, this stage is still currently Pump Fun's largest source of cash (2) Pump swap fee scale = 23.40 million + 25.64 million + 74.87 million, totaling about 124 million USD This is the part of the data most easily overlooked by the market because the past market perception of Pump Fun was mostly limited to "a platform that issues Memes" But in fact, after a Meme or token completes the Bonding Curve phase on Pump fun, it enters PumpSwap for continued trading This stage corresponds to the second phase of the token lifecycle (3) Other business = 9.05 million + 1.06 million, totaling about 10.11 million USD This part is currently small in scale, totaling only about ten million, belonging to ancillary tools, so I won't elaborate here _____________________________________ There is another point in Figure 2 that needs to be expanded: In Defillama's original statistical scope, the total revenue created by a protocol is fully included in the revenue items So there are some repeated items in the cost section, which can easily cause confusion, so you have to look at the profit part, which is the money the protocol actually keeps. I did not expand on the details in the original chart Of the approximately 212 million USD in fees in Q2, Pump fun ultimately retained about 91.55 million USD in gross profit, corresponding to about a 43% gross margin ➠ PumpSwap's profit ultimately captured by the protocol was 23.40 million USD, while Bonding Curve retained 62.06 million USD For these two business segments, the fee scale is larger for the former than the latter, but the value ultimately captured by the protocol is significantly higher for the latter Comparing the change curves of these two business segments over the past few quarters (Figure 3), Bonding Curve clearly depends on market sentiment and has a strong positive correlation with Solana's on-chain activity. Looking at the detailed data change points, this part is very sensitive In contrast, PumpSwap's growth curve is smoother, which further indicates that Pump Fun's revenue structure has changed ➠ In the past, the platform mainly captured value during the token issuance phase, but now the trading phase is becoming a new income supplement The issuance phase has higher protocol capture capability, thus contributing higher profit margins Swap business requires distributing more value to liquidity providers and creators, reducing protocol profit margins, but it covers the longer-term trading demand after token issuance Finally, a brief mention: from the daily K-line chart, $PUMP is in a pullback phase within an uptrend, and the current price around 0.0022 has not yet reached a support level That is all~

#Circle财报后押注Arc，USDC能否迎来新增长？ Suddenly realized "Circle $CRCL, this type of stablecoin issuing company, feels a bit like standing in the era of internet media but still choosing the old-fashioned ALL IN on print media" "No matter how chaotic the on-chain environment is, it still relies on scale to earn its reserve income" "Circle might suffer in the future interest rate cut cycle" Adding some data: Circle's USDC scale and usage both grew rapidly in Q2 ➠ End-of-period circulation reached $73.3 billion, a 19% year-over-year increase; quarterly on-chain transaction volume reached $14.8 trillion, a 151% year-over-year increase ➠ But Circle's total revenue and reserve income were only $701 million, a 7% year-over-year increase, below market expectations Looking at these data together: USDC growth is network scale, Circle's growth is mainly interest income There is no strong positive correlation between the two This is a point I overlooked when writing the stablecoin report before, that the stablecoin business model has little correlation with on-chain activity; no matter how chaotic the on-chain environment is, it still relies on scale to earn its reserve income I previously said it was the most stable business model, but I didn't consider that this is also the least attractive aspect Stablecoin issuers do not and cannot charge fees on every stablecoin on-chain transfer; for example, when USDC transfers from one address to another, the Gas Fee paid by users mainly goes to the corresponding chain, not Circle So the $14.8 trillion on-chain transaction volume can indicate that USDC's usage frequency, liquidity, and settlement status are improving, but it cannot directly indicate how much income Circle gains from it Looking at another set of data: average USDC circulation grew about 25% year-over-year, but reserve income only grew 5% year-over-year The two did not grow synchronously, and the reason lies in reserve income; this data also clarifies Circle's current business model Logically, the larger the USDC scale, the more reserve assets Circle can use to generate interest, and reserve income should increase accordingly ➠ But this quarter, reserve yield dropped by 66 basis points year-over-year The added USDC scale indeed brought more reserve assets, but the unit yield these assets can generate declined; scale is going up, but unit price is going down This ultimately resulted in average USDC growth of 25% but reserve income growth of only 5% This again confirms the current state of this business model: "No matter how chaotic the on-chain environment is, it still relies on scale to earn its reserve income" Stablecoins are on-chain products, but the issuer's profit and loss statement is affected by real-world benchmark interest rates; in an industry closest to money, this is somewhat unappealing If a clearer interest rate cut environment follows, this problem will become more acute; the same USDC scale can generate completely different income under different interest rate environments USDC scale needs to maintain sufficiently fast growth to offset the impact of declining reserve yields on income This naturally raises a question: how can Circle break free from interest rate dependence and redefine the value of a stablecoin company? Its reserve income accounts for 95% of total income, meaning other parts of income are currently insufficient to be called a second growth point I reviewed [other income]; currently, there is no business segment large enough or with clear financial contribution to be called a second growth point Circle now has a huge dollar reserve pool but has not yet established a value capture system strongly tied to stablecoin network growth Therefore, Circle urgently needs a second growth curve; otherwise, Circle and similar stablecoin issuers feel like standing in the era of internet media but still choosing the old-fashioned ALL IN on print media