Still want to learn from Rich Dad? $1.2 billion in debt On September 2, citing the New York Post, Robert Kiyosaki, author of "Rich Dad Poor Dad," recently revealed in an interview that he is carrying $1.2 billion in debt, quickly drawing market attention. However, this approximately $1.2 billion debt actually comes from mortgage loans on apartment buildings, not from his long-promoted investments in Bitcoin and gold. Kiyosaki's ex-wife and business partner further clarified that this debt is a loan shared with partners, involving about 1,500 apartment units, and Kiyosaki's personal financial exposure is far less than this apparent figure. It is worth noting that although Kiyosaki has publicly advocated holding gold and Bitcoin as tools to hedge against inflation multiple times, these digital asset holdings have not been used as collateral for any loans. In fact, while Kiyosaki heavily promotes Bitcoin, the real collateral is physical real estate and rental income, which also reflects that Bitcoin is not yet widely accepted as collateral in the real financial system like real estate. However, critics point out that this high-leverage operation model can amplify gains during market upswings but will generate huge losses once the housing price rally ends. This risk is particularly worth attention in the current economic environment. Interestingly, Kiyosaki has publicly warned that cheap credit will destroy the financial system, yet his own investment portfolio heavily relies on credit to sustain itself. This discrepancy between words and practice has also caused market observers to question his investment advice. In fact, Kiyosaki has a prior bankruptcy record; his company filed for bankruptcy protection in 2012 due to a lawsuit loss. This experience shows that even authorities in financial education do not always make flawless personal investment decisions. bitcoin:native

Chengdu really has a lot of food, with spicy rabbit heads and fatty intestine noodles all over the streets. It made me want to eat so badly, but unfortunately my companion doesn't eat spicy food, so we had no choice but to settle for five bland dishes, costing less than 18U. There are small taverns and bars everywhere, with live singers, folk music, and street performances, all quite distinctive. At night, we ate spicy hotpot skewers but didn't drink; we'll make up for it tomorrow.

Zhang Lei's "LONGi Moment": Billions in Losses, When the "Friend of Time" Is Devoured by Time On the last day of August 2026, LONGi Green Energy's stock closed at ¥12.07, with a market value under 100 billion. Yet five years ago that winter, this company was the brightest photovoltaic star in the A-share market, with a market cap surpassing 540 billion. When Hillhouse Capital acquired 6% of shares via a ¥15.8 billion agreement, the market hailed it as "the best example of value investing in China." Today, Hillhouse has disappeared from LONGi's top ten shareholders list. Market estimates put the actual net loss on this investment between ¥7 billion and ¥10 billion. Over six years, from a "textbook investment" to a "textbook exit," what exactly happened? The Cruelty of Timing: Not "Overpaying," but "Buying at the Cycle's Peak" One easily overlooked fact in reviewing this deal: Hillhouse's entry price of ¥70 per share came after LONGi's stock had already nearly tripled that year. Even accounting for two subsequent 10-for-4 stock splits, the adjusted cost basis was about ¥35.71 per share, and at the November 2021 peak, unrealized gains exceeded ¥10 billion. But the problem was that the photovoltaic industry's profit peak occurred in 2022—net profit attributable to parent company was ¥14.8 billion, with a gross margin around 20%—and declined steadily thereafter. Hillhouse bought near the cycle top valuation, expecting LONGi to grow through cycles like a consumer sector leader. This is like buying down jacket futures in midsummer, betting on a colder, longer winter, but failing to anticipate the "warm winter" caused by capacity surges. Why Was LONGi's "Moat" Vulnerable to the Cycle? Zhang Lei emphasized structural competitive advantages in "Value." LONGi indeed has the world's lowest non-silicon cost for wafers, leading monocrystalline technology, and a solid financial strategy. But the nature of photovoltaic manufacturing means these advantages lack "pricing power" amid overcapacity. From 2020 to 2023, the industry invested over ¥3 trillion in capacity expansion, causing silicon material, wafers, cells, and modules capacity to far exceed global demand. When module prices fall below cost, even the lowest-cost companies only "lose the least," not "make profits." LONGi's module and cell gross margins approached zero in the first half of 2026, and wafer business even showed negative gross margin—losing money on every wafer sold. More critically, the wavering technology path hurt. The industry's shift from PERC to TOPCon exceeded expectations, while LONGi bet on the BC (back contact) route. In 2024, HPBC 1.0 underperformed in performance and cost, causing large inventory write-downs and production halts, directly dragging down results. Founder Li Zhenguo resigned as general manager in 2025, retreating to R&D—a "founder stepping back" signal more symbolic than any financial report figure. Controversy over Securities Lending: From "Beacon" to "Under Investigation" and Reputation Collapse In 2023, Hillhouse's HHLR lent 64.48 million shares through securities lending, reducing its stake from 5.85% to 5.00%, then further to 4.98% without announcement. This "precise calculation" triggered regulatory investigation, forcing Hillhouse to proactively repurchase shares above 5% in 2024 to comply. But the reputational damage was irreversible. An institution once known for "long-termism" and regarded by countless retail investors as a value investing benchmark was suspected of exploiting regulatory loopholes to "secretly transfer shares." This not only cast doubt on Hillhouse's integrity but exposed private equity's fundamental dilemma: when LP redemption pressure, performance evaluation, and fund duration overlap, "long-term" often must yield to "liquidity." Who Is Responsible for the Billions in Losses? A More Structural Perspective Attributing it simply to "Zhang Lei's misjudgment" is too crude. In fact, Hillhouse's failure in LONGi is an intersection of three mismatches: Mismatch of valuation and cycle: entering at the industry's peak but pricing with a "ten-year perspective." Mismatch of asset nature and investment framework: valuing a manufacturing cyclical stock as a consumer or tech growth stock, overestimating the depth of the cost advantage "moat." Mismatch of capital nature and holding period: private equity fund duration and exit pressure prevent truly waiting for the next cycle recovery. A useful comparison is Hillhouse's investment in Gree—¥41.6 billion entry, similarly over ¥10 billion unrealized loss, but Gree still benefits from brand premium, dividend cash flow, and stable air conditioner replacement demand as buffers. Photovoltaic modules lack brand stickiness; downstream customers only recognize price, so when overcapacity hits, no leader can single-handedly resist industry-wide losses. LONGi's "Post-Hillhouse Era": Structural Dawn and a Long Tunnel After Hillhouse's exit, LONGi's 2026 interim report remains bleak: revenue ¥27 billion, down 17.6% year-on-year; net loss ¥3.68 billion, loss widened 43%; operating cash flow negative ¥5.8 billion. But behind these figures, two structural changes deserve attention: BC module sales reached 19.55 GW, up 125% year-on-year, shipment share jumped above 65%—Li Zhenguo's six-year technology bet finally scaling; Second quarter loss narrowed quarter-on-quarter, single-quarter gross margin turned positive at 3.13%, overseas module sales grew 26%, overseas revenue share exceeded 65%. With over ¥50 billion in cash on hand, LONGi has a "thicker coat" than most peers in this industry winter. If BC technology continues to reduce costs and improve efficiency over the next two to three years, reaching or surpassing TOPCon competition, then the capital that exited today may indeed have sold at "the darkest moment before dawn." The Friend of Time Ultimately Lost to Time Hillhouse's LONGi case is essentially a stress test of "long-termism" on Chinese manufacturing cyclical stocks. The result: when industry cycle length exceeds fund duration, when technology uncertainty overturns cost advantages, when regulatory and public opinion compress operational space, even the smartest capital can only accept losses and exit. But this does not mean "long-termism" itself is invalid. It reminds investors that the premise of long-termism is truly being able to wait for that "long term." For institutional capital with exit deadlines and performance pressure, discussing a ten-year vision at the cycle peak is an overly expensive luxury. LONGi remains, Li Zhenguo remains in the lab, BC is scaling. Hillhouse has left, losses realized. The final answer on the "right or wrong" of this investment may only be seen when the next photovoltaic cycle arrives and we look back at today's ¥12.07 stock price—to know who truly was the "friend of time."

The biggest worry in the Chinese film industry has arrived. "Niu Lai" not only hasn't been taken down, but its run has been extended, and now the box office is close to 60 million. What's even funnier is that more and more "Niu Lai" films are flooding into cinemas. For example, the third picture, "Unblinking," was entirely handled by one person, who maximized solo operation, even surpassing the original creators of "Niu Lai," who were two people after all. #NiuLai

Is JT's troll army making a move? Everywhere there are people bashing Justin Sun, saying he was put on some kind of fox-hunting list. I think that's impossible; he's in Hong Kong (Sun even posted photos holding the TRON blockchain hash with Victoria Harbour). If they wanted to arrest him, would they need a list? They would just intercept him directly. Hong Kong has already returned to China. Think about it a bit: this time Hong Kong is hosting the Bitcoin Asia conference in a high-profile way. Which of the crypto big shots coming here doesn't have border control risks? They all dare to come to Hong Kong openly to participate in the crypto conference, openly appearing on camera. This already says a lot. These people are not stupid, right? The stupid ones are the rumor spreaders. Yesterday I had dinner with a relative and we talked about the egg incident. She doesn't understand what cryptocurrency is but still cursed Sun's virtual currency as a scam. I told her to look at the data first: TRON, in its 9 years of existence, has increased 226 times; in the last 5 years, it increased 4.7 times; in the last 3 years, 4.5 times; and in the last year, 1.2 times. Of course, I don't encourage everyone to play with virtual coins because the volatility is too high and most people can't bear it. But if you say Sun cheated you out of money, that's a bit far-fetched. You can't just talk about getting hit without mentioning the gains. ​@justinsuntron @HTX_Molly #TRONEcoStar

Looks great, the days of watching AI blockbusters in theaters are probably not far off! Enjoy the first episode of "Divine Fall 2" #HeavenFallsOneGod, the earth cracks into desolation. Divine remains turn into treasures, and the world fights over them. #Fantasy #AIShortDrama

Sometimes you just have to marvel at how bizarrely diverse people are, even though they are man-made. The differences between people are really huge, and even siblings can have completely different personalities. For example, some people can't stay indoors for even a minute; they always want to go out hiking, crossing rivers, or exercising nonstop. Others can't understand this at all and prefer to stay at home, eating well, sleeping well, and playing online games. Actually, everyone just does their own thing, and there's no right or wrong. The real problem is when two very different people insist on living together. That becomes exhausting, and usually one person ends up giving up their hobbies to accommodate the other, possibly for a lifetime. When young, you tolerate it because the other looks beautiful, but over time, as you grow old and aesthetic fatigue sets in, you no longer want to accommodate, and conflicts arise. Therefore, I strongly oppose the idea of finding a partner who complements you. In reality, there is no such thing as complementarity; it's just one side accommodating the other. It's much simpler, more comfortable, and more harmonious for two similar people to be together. Neither has to make an effort to accommodate or please the other. You love diving and hiking, and I do too; you love staying home playing games, and I do too. That is true harmony and bliss. So remember, when looking for a partner, be sure to find someone like yourself. Never look for a complementary person, absolutely not

Yesterday, I had the opportunity to watch this year's college student drama showcase live at the Beijing People's Art Theatre Small Stage. It was really great and exciting, with a full house and a very lively atmosphere. Notice the dining photo below; I think I saw a familiar face from the crypto circle. Can anyone recognize them? The schools performing that day included Capital Normal University, Renmin University, Tianjin Normal University, Beijing Normal University, and the Central Academy of Drama. The young students' performances were passionate and full of infectious energy. The Capital Normal University Drama Troupe's "Snow White Pig Head" left a deep impression on me. It is adapted from a short story by Su Tong, with a plot full of twists and turns, sincere and natural acting, and very professional directing, lighting, and scene transitions, truly capturing the essence of the original work. I have to say, the performance effect at the Beijing People's Art Theatre Small Stage is amazing. The lighting makes it feel like watching a movie, with clear and bright facial colors, and the sound effects are even better. The actors perform without microphones, and every line is heard clearly throughout the venue. It was such an enjoyable experience. No wonder it is a top national stage located in the heart of Beijing. I recommend everyone to experience it if they have the chance